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In Hunt v. General Insurance Company of America,' an agent
issued two policies of insurance upon the same house, one policy in
favor of the life tenant and the other in favor of the remainderman,
each covering the "interest" of named assured. A partial loss oc-
curred. The insurer (which had issued both policies) contended that
its obligation to both insureds was the amount of the loss, which
would be divided according to the respective interests. Each assured
claimed the full amount of the partial loss. The lower court held
the remainderman limited by the "interest" provision of the policy
to her proportionate share of the partial loss based upon her interest
in the property, but held the insurer liable to the life tenant for the
full amount of the partial loss. On appeal the Supreme Court af-
firmed, with a vigorous dissent by justice Oxner.
The decision has already been the subject of a case note in the
Quarterly2 and attention is directed thereto for a rather full analysis.
The writer confesses bias in view of his connection with the litiga-
tion; we would merely point out that the decision is a departure from
the rule prevailing in South Carolina even prior to the adoption of
the "interest" policy to the effect that the holder of a limited interest
in property can recover no more than his loss - i. e., "interest". The
majority opinion seems unsupported by the Standard Policy or the
Valued Policy Law.
LinE
Fraud in the Application
The question of fraud in the application for a life insurance con-
tract was the subject of two cases during the year. In Phillips v.
Life and Casualty Insurance Company of Tennessees a father ap-
plied for insurance on his two year old child; in answering the ques-
tions asked in the application, he concealed the child's history of
convulsions in connection with serious illnesses, which illnesses were
likewise concealed. The lower court submitted the question of fraud
to the jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the beneficiary
Attorney at Law, Columbia, S. C.
1. 87 S.E. 2d 34 (S.C. 1955).
2. 7 S.C.L.Q. 665 (Summer 1955).
3. 226 S.C. 336, 84 S.E. 2d 197 (1954).
1
Nettles: Insurance
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERIY
of the policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the
circumstances the only reasonable inference was that the policy had
been procured by fraud. The question whether the application and
receipt of premium by the agent constituted a binder was not passed
upon, the court treating the case as though the insurance contract was
in existence at the time of the child's death (from convulsions).
Arnold v. Life Insurance Company of Georgia4 also turned, even-
tually, upon the issue of fraud in the application. There, a husband
accompanied his 19 year old bride of a few weeks to the agent's office
and participated in her answers to the questions in the application.
At about the same time a number of other policies on her life were
taken out under similar circumstances. A few weeks later the hus-
band murdered his bride. While the murder of the insured by the
beneficiary will void the beneficiary's rights to the insurance, it does
not avoid the insurance entirely; the insurance remains in effect for
the benefit of the estate of the insured;5 in this case the suit was
brought by the estate of the insured to recover the proceeds. But the
rule, that the insurance is not rendered void if the beneficiary mur-
ders the insured, is subject to an exception: where the beneficiary
procured the policy, intending at that time to murder the insured,
the policy is void for all purposes. 6 The evidence in this case point-
ing to that inference is so strong that it would seem that the court
would have been justified in holding that a verdict should have been
directed for the insurer on that ground. However, there was no
question but that the application concealed the fact that the insured
had been hospitalized in a mental institution, and the court held
that fraud in this respect entitled the insurer to a directed verdict.
On this point the case is one of novel impression in this State.
One other point is worthy of consideration; it was contended that
since the insured was only 19 years old, fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions made by her in the application for insurance could not be set up
against her. Although there is some authority for this position,7 the
South Carolina court followed the majority rule to the contrary.
CASUALTY
School Bus Insurance
School bus insurance was the subject of two cases decided by the
court during the past year. Both cases were brought by the same
4. 226 S.C. 60, 83 S.E. 2d 553 (1954).
5. APPLEIMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 381 (1941); Smith v. Todd,
155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506, 70 A.L.R. 1529 (1930).
6. APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 5, § 382; Henderson v. Life Insurance Co. of
Va., 176 S.C. 100, 179 S.E. 680 (1935).
7. See Annotation, 143 A.L.R. 331.
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plaintiff, a pupil who was injured when a school bus backed over
him while he was playing on the school grounds. Insurance, under
Section 1 (A) (1) of the Act,8 was provided by a policy issued by
Indemnity Insurance Company of North America. Insurance, un-
der Section 1 (A) (2), was provided by a policy issued by National
Surety Corporation. Plaintiff sued both insurers, claiming to be
covered by both provisions of the Act. National Surety Company
demurred to the complaint in the suit against it. The demurrer
was sustained, and the Supreme Court affirmed.9 The facts are
almost the same as Farme&" v. National Surety Corporation,10 and
the court reaffirmed the proposition that a pupil is covered by
Section 1 (A) (1) but not 1 (A) (2).
The Indemnity Insurance Company of North America had accept-
ed the claim as compensable under its policy. It paid, apparently as
they were presented, bills for medical expenses aggregating $1,953.00.
These payments were made directly to the doctor and nurses. When
a hospital bill for $1,620.20 was presented the insurer tendered to
the hospital $1,047.00, the difference between the $3,000.00 limit of
benefits and the amount previously paid. This was refused by the
hospital. The minor then brought suit, claiming that the entire $3,-
000.00 should be paid to him. The insurer claimed credit for the
amounts previously paid directly to the doctor and nurses, and the
lower court allowed the credit. On appeal, the Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that direct payment by the insurer to those rendering
medical services was improper, but subrogating the insurer to what-
ever right the parties paid by it would have against the estate of
the minor.11
Although the statute did not directly specify the party to whom
payments should be made, the policy provided that payment for medi-
cal expenses should be made "to the insured employee" which term
included the plaintiff. The decision seems hard, because the insurer
apparently had tried to discharge its obligation in the best of faith;
however, good faith is no protection where funds to which a minor's
estate are entitled are paid otherwise than strictly according to law.
Also, of course, there would be the danger of preference if it should
be left entirely up to the insurer to determine who should be paid.
8. 47 STAT. 546, 671 (1951).
9. Collins v. National Surety Corp., 225 S.C. 405, 82 S.E. 2d 789 (1954).
10. 223 S.C. 143, 74 S.E. 2d 580 (1953).
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Automobile
Of interest to the South Carolina practitioner is the case of Con-
tinental Casualty Company v. Padgett,12 decided by the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. Even though, of course, the decision is not
authoritative, save for the Federal District Courts, in declaring the
law of South Carolina, it indicates what the court concludes is the
South Carolina law in the absence of direct authority of our Supreme
Court thereabout.
In that case, the policy contained an "Omnibus Clause". Such
clauses provide policy coverage not only for the named assured but
also for any person operating the insured automobile provided the
"actual use" is with the permission of the named assured. An em-
ployee of the named insured was allowed to use the insured's truck
to take some scrap wood to the employee's mother. Following that,
he was to park the truck at the employer's place of business over
the weekend, and get it again on Monday morning to pick up certain
other employees. The employee completed his errand and left the
truck as directed. Later, on Saturday night, he got the truck again;
and while on an apparent joy ride with some friends, he had a colli-
sion. The insurer brought an action for declaratory judgment seek-
ing a declaration that the employee was not, in the circumstances,
within the coverage afforded by the "Omnibus Clause".
The trial court charged the jury that express permission for a
given purpose constituted permission for all purposes, and that so
long as the car was delivered to the employee with permission of the
named assured, the employee would be covered even though the car
was driven to a place, or for a purpose, not contemplated by the in-
sured when he parted with the possession. The insurer appealed
from judgment against it. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court and found it in error in refusing the insurer's motion for di-
rected verdict and in submitting the case to the jury under the in-
structions given.
Decisions construing the "Omnibus Clause" have evolved three
rules. The rule which is probably the majority rule is that so long
as the vehicle is used for a purpose reasonably within the scope of
the permission granted, and within the time or geographic limits
contemplated, the operator will be covered. Stated otherwise, the
operator is covered unless the use made of the automobile by the
bailee so exceeds the scope of the permission as to make him liable
for conversion of the automobile. 13 Another rule, somewhat more
12. 219 F. 2d 133 (1955).
13. APPLEMAN, op. cit. suipra note 5, § 4367.
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liberal, provides coverage for the bailee even though there is a devia-
tion from the terms of the bailment, so long as the use made is not
a gross violation of the bailment. 14 Finally, there is the so called
"Hell or High Water" rule, which holds that so long as the vehicle
was originally entrusted to the bailee by the named assured, the
bailee is covered throughout the operation of the vehicle, no matter
how far he departs from the terms upon which the car was entrusted
to him.15
The trial court followed the "Hell or High Water" rule; the
Court of Appeals refused to assume that the South Carolina court
would hold this extreme view.
A more limited coverage provision was involved in Barkley v. In-
ternational Insurance Company.16 There the policy provided cover-
age for the named assured and for any member of the insured's
"immediate family" operating the automobile with the insured's per-
mission. The insured, with his wife and child, lived in Alabama and
later moved to North Carolina. His brother maintained his home
in Sumter, South Carolina where he lived with his family. The
brother apparently borrowed the insured's automobile and was in-
volved in a collision in Sumter, South Carolina. The insurer con-
tended that the brother was not a member of the "immediate family"
of the insured. The lower court so held; on appeal, the Supreme
Court affirmed. The contract was written and delivered in the State
of Alabama, and the court relied on the Alabama law. However, the
inference is clear that the court felt the Alabama rule was correct;
and it is not unlikely that the same result would be reached were the
court passing on a South Carolina contract. The result seems reason-
able: the obvious intent of the policyis to insure a family group, that
is, members of a given household, who may be reasonably expected
to operate the automobile on occasion. It is the "immediacy" with
reference to which the parties contract the "immediacy" in this sense
rather than geneological nicety should determine the group en-
visioned by the coverage. Hence, a distant cousin who actually lives
in the insured's household is more "immediate" as to the operation
of the automobile than would be a brother, sister, or parent living
separate and apart.
Where a person owns two automobiles and is insured against lia-
bility by separate insurers with respect to each car, which insurer
is required to defend and indemnify if the insured is sued for a wreck
14. APPLIMAN, op. cit. supra note 5, § 4368.
15. APMLEMAN, op. cit. sitpra note 5, § 4366.
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occurring while he is driving one car and towing the other (driver-
less) ? That question was presented in American Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 17 decided by the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals. The insurer covering the towing vehicle paid judgments
in two cases arising out of such a collision, and then sued the insurer
of the towed car for contribution. The ground of defense was that
the injuries sued for did not arise out of the ownership, maintenance,
or use "of the towed car." Held: the towed car was on the road
by means of its running gear, and this constituted "use" within the
contemplation of the policy, and contribution allowed. The question
whether the third party's injuries were caused by the towing car, the
towed car, or both, was not discussed.
In Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Bobo' s a six-
months automobile policy expired on February 20. Prior to expira-
tion the insured was told by the agent that she could "let (the premi-
um) ride for thirty days". On March 20, the premium was mailed to
the insurer and thereafter on the same day the automobile was demo-
lished in a collision. The insurer never returned the premium. It wrote
the insured on April 7, after it learned of the accident, stating that
the premium had arrived too late to prevent cancellation of the old
policy but could be applied upon a new policy beginning March 22.
On appeal by the insurer, the judgment against it was affirmed. The
court held that the agent of the insurer had authority to grant the
thirty days grace for payment of the premium, but relied more heavi-
ly on the fact that the insurer had retained the premium, even after
the insured refused to accept any new policy. This was in accord
with South Carolina holding that even where an agent exceeded his
authority in issuing a policy, the insurer cannot retain the premium
and still insist that the insurance never came into effect. Assuming
the facts as found by the lower court, which the Court of Appeals
was required to do, the case seems merely to involve the extension
of credit for premium, which does not, in the absence of a contrary
provision of the policy, keep the insurance from coming into effect.' 9
Mention of insurance coverage in evidence or argument of counsel
is regarded as so likely to prejudice a jury that it is regarded as
ground for declaring a mistrial. 20 But what results when the damning
accusation is sought to be injected into a trial by examination of the
panel on voir dire?
17. 214 F. 2d 523 (1954).
18. 214 F. 2d 575 (4th Cir. 1954).
19. APPLEI:AN, IxStRANCn LAW AND PRACTICE § 8007 (1941).
20. Harsford v. Carolina Glass Co., 92 S.C. 236, 75 S.E. 533 (1912) ; Ander-
son v. Ballenger, 166 S.C. 44, 164 S.E. 313 (1932); cf. Pardue v. Pardue, 167
S.C. 129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932).
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That question was presented in Wood v. England.2'1 So far as ap-
peared from the pleadings, the suit was an ordinary negligence suit
between individuals over a motor vehicle collision. Upon call of the
case, plaintiffs' counsel submitted a request that the court ask the
panel whether any prospective juror was connected with either of
two specified casualty insurers. The request was refused, the jury
found for the defendants, and plaintiff moved for new trial, on the
ground of the refusal of its request. The motion was denied and on
appeal the Supreme Court affirmed.
No clear rule was laid down by the court regarding the propriety
of such questioning: instead, the court held that, since there was no
showing in the pleadings or by affidavit that liability insurance was
involved, there was no showing of prejudice or abuse of discretion
in denying the request. The somewhat more interesting question of
what would have been the courts' ruling had insurance actually been
(sub rosa) involved remains unanswered.
Hospitalization
A hospital insurance policy in Jones v. National Bankers Life In-
surance Company2= contained the provision that it did not cover dis-
ability or hospitalization while the insured was "confined to any in-
stitution wherein the insured is entitled to services without cost to
himself." The insured was an employee of the Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Company and a member of its Relief Department, for which
he paid $3.50 monthly dues. Plaintiff was hospitalized and made
claim for benefits under the policy. The insurer contended that
since the hospitalization had been furnished to plaintiff by the Relief
Department, the claim was within the exclusion. The court held
that no showing that the hospital services received by the plaintiff
were without cost to himself was disclosed where he contributed part
of the cost of maintaining the Relief Department.
Two other cases involved insurance and hence deserve mention
here, although they add nothing to the subjective law of insurance.
Both cases turned upon the sufficiency of pleading. In Gardner v.
Mutual Health and Accident Association,2 3 the complaint jumbled al-
legations sounding in tort with allegations pointing toward fraud in
the inception. A motion to strike the allegations that the plaintiff
was, by fraud of the agent, induced to cancel a policy with another
insurer was denied, and Supreme Court affirmed. The ground of
21. 226 S.C. 73, 83 S.E. 2d 644 (1954).
22. 86 S.E. 2d 871 (S.C. 1955).
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the decision is vague; indeed, the decision may be authority for
nothing more than that the order was not appealable.
The complaint in Williams v. United Insurance Company24 con-
tained two causes of action, one for fraudulent breach and the other
for fraud in the inception. The gravamen of the first cause of action
was that after the insurer's agent had for a long time made weekly
visits to the plaintiff's house to collect the premium, he ceased so to
do; at his last visit he tore up the premium receipt book stating that
the policy was no good, but collected the premium. This was held by
the Supreme Court to state a cause of action for fraudulent breach.
The demurrer was sustained as to the second cause of action claim-
ing fraud in collecting the premium for two policies, each of which
contained a provision avoiding the policy in the event of other in-
surance; the court held that, in the absence of allegations that the
insurer had declared the policy void on account of the provisions, no
damage was shown.
24. 86 S.E. 2d 486 (S.C. 1955).
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